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The British vote to leave the European Union came as a surprise and a shock. It has been
understood as an aberration, as a triumph of populism and nationalism, in conflict with the
ethos of the Union. But Brexit should not be understood as a mere aberration, but instead
as one position on continuum of exhausted thinking about EU and (transnational) law in
general. From the perspective of “pure” legal theory, Brexit is self-referential, resulting from
the internal dynamics of the system. It is a result of the general lack of legal and economic
imagination as to how the EU should be reordered and reimagined.
European collaboration is both necessary and inevitable. It is one of the guarantors of
peace and overall economic growth on the continent. The European Union is a remarkable
achievement in numerous respects, but one that has since its inception slowly calcified. It
has ceased to animate and inspire Europeans. The European Union project has already
lost some of its appeal, both because of the ongoing Euro crisis and a long-term power shift
to East Asia. The idea that the “European way of Law” serves as a model for the rest of the
world has been undermined.
Europe needs radical change in thinking about governance. But Brexit is not a radical
change, it is defeatism based on the existing spectrum of thinking. The discourse
surrounding Brexit and the act of leaving the Union itself reproduces the daily European
discourse: a discourse too focused on disaggregated sovereignty, border controls and
participation in the system. This often misrepresents power relationships, arrests legal re-
imagination, and contributes to the reproduction of existing hierarchies in Europe. Brexit
thus reveals a lack of analytical clarity and a lack of vision to restart and reimagine the
European project.
European Union as a New Legal Order
The European Union was a transformative strategy for peace among the states of Western
Europe, an antidote to the negative features of the state and statal intercourse and credited
with having developed a model of governance not based on power and strength, but self-
limitation.[1] The Union has been credited with constituting a sui generis new legal order[2],
based on a distinct ethos of taking into account the interests of others.
Joseph Weiler construed two competing visions of the “Promised Land” to which the
European Union is being led, the unity vision and the community vision. Both try to address
the mischief embodied in the excess of the modern nation-state and the traditional model of
statal intercourse that was premised on full sovereignty, autonomy, independence and a
relentless defence of the national interest.[3]
The unity vision is a progressive step of establishing a common market and approximating
economic policies through ever tighter economic integration resulting in full political union,
in some version of federal United States of Europe, finally and decisively replacing the
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hitherto warring Member States.[4]
The community vision, Europe’s “Sonderweg”, a distinct mode of governance, sees as its
“ideal type” a political union in which Community and Member State continue their uneasy
co-existence, although with an ever-increasing embrace. It is premised on limiting or
sharing, sovereignty in a select albeit growing number of fields, on recognizing and even
celebrating the reality of interdependence in a community of states and people sharing
overlapping, but somewhat distinct values and aspirations. The latter vision does not
involve a negation of the state. The tension among state actors and between each state
actor and the community is central to this vision.
While, according to Weiler, the ethos of unity is strength and power, the ethos of the
community is self-limitation. In this vision, many policies in the public realm can no longer
be adopted without examining their consonance with the interest of others and the interest
of “Europe[5].” On the other hand, in the ethos of unity, the value of the Union is measured
ultimately and exclusively with the coin of national utility and not community solidarity.[6]
The unity and the community visions are thus portrayed as incompatible with one another
and as being distinct and in a sharp contrast.
The two visions, however, can be understood as different positions on a single spectrum of
legal thought, representing different positions on a single continuum between
autonomy/self-interest on the one end of the spectrum and altruism/interdependence on the
other.[7] Weiler’s unity vision presents the two opposite extremes of the spectrum. Exit from
the Union would be a result of the ultimate self-interest. A complete federation, a “super
state”, a state of complete interdependence, is at the opposite side of the spectrum.
The community vision is the middle position between the two extremes. It is neither
premised on national self-interest, nor does it form a complete federation, a super state.
The two visions can thus be understood as positions on the same continuum of
disaggregated sovereignty, a staple of contemporary global legal thought.[8] In this
understanding, there is no separate ethos of a “community vision”, no novel ethos that
defines the European Union. Rather, the building of the Union can be understood as
irreducibly torn between selfish self-interest and altruist interdependence, between apology
and utopia[9], as any other form of governance in the world.
The Lost Vision
The idea of a distinct ethos of a “community”, the position of institutional centrism and
economic interdependence provided a vision of European integration in the era of the post-
war and post-cold war European reconstruction. It offered a unique model for reshaping
transnational discourse among states, peoples and individuals who emerged from the nadir
of Western civilization, serving as a model for other regions of the world[10]and promising
an embrace of the Eastern side of the Continent, ravaged by decades of repression and
mismanagement.
The position of institutional centrism and economic interdependence that had fuelled
European collaboration is no longer a mobilizing force for the polity. Lawyers and other
policy-makers have been falsely substituting legal tools such as stages of integration or the
“new legal order” supported by the “community” ethos for the population’s reality. Once the
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belief of the population in the existence of a novel ethos has waned through the decades of
the EU’s existence, people were left only with their daily reality. The population started to
realize the impossibility of the professed ideal of “inclusion of the other” within the
European Union.[11] In everyday life, the lofty ideals are felt as a hierarchical struggle
determined by irreducible exclusion. Thus, European Union’s institutions now present just
one of several factors of governance, no longer enjoying the halo of a “higher” ethos.
Today, people’s daily reality is not a traumatic memory or a fear of war. Likewise,
interdependence is not a vision of social change – it is a reality. People feel and see the
interdependence of global politics and global economy on the daily basis, in stores, at
workplace, on television and the internet, and do not crave for more of it in their daily lives.
Calls for increased institutional and economic interdependence thus have little mobilizing
value.
If the European Union is to continue to be visionary, it must address people’s daily reality.
Particularly, it must address its own contribution to the reproduction of the unjust
hierarchical reality that prevents self-realization and stifles the lives of the masses across
the European continent and the world in general. Hierarchical structures of power without
an implicit element of merit are reproducing themselves throughout the United Kingdom,
Europe, and the world. [12] The daily operation of power, however, is not adequately
addressed by the legal profession.
The community vision is presented as one of self-limitation, as opposed to the ethos of
power and strength of the unity vision. One of the aims of the community vision is making
sure that states and individuals are equal under the frame of interdependence. However,
the operation of power cannot be eliminated by any mode of governance. Hierarchical
reality can only be reimagined, resisted and adjusted.
Some people’s dilemmas in the British referendum on the EU are well portrayed by a
CNN’s report about why people in Hull, a peripheral English city that has been in decline for
years, voted for Brexit. One man vividly portrayed the situation: “Nowt [nothing] to lose
have we. I don’t think so… we ain’t got nowt [nothing] anyway.”[13]
Certainly, there have been elements of false consciousness in voting in the British
referendum. Those who actually benefit from the EU budget may have voted for leaving the
Union. However, the budgetary transfers alone fail to address the daily hierarchical struggle
– the unidentified and unaddressed injuries and losses through the daily operation of the
legal structure.[14]
The daily hierarchical struggle has not been seriously addressed by lawyers and policy-
makers. Lawyers, regardless of their pursuit of the unity or community vision, have learned
to daily use the theory of integration from a free trade agreement, to a customs union and
to the internal market and common currency, and understand it as a story of a successive
dismantling of trade obstacles set up by state borders and lack of cooperation.[15]
Disaggregating sovereignty by a progressive demolition of border controls and related
measures is, just as integration through the institutional structure, premised on the
continuum between individualism/self-interest, on the one end of the spectrum, and
altruism/interdependence on the other.
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Much of the discussion on the development of EU change is thus premised on the axes of
more or less free trade, more or less common standards, more or less border obstacles and
more and less Europe. Such accounts feed the discussion of deeper integration and
greater economic interdependence as opposed to disintegration that reflects the thinking
about law and policy of European and international leadership today.
Consequently, revolt against the hierarchical structures is articulated in terms of a rejection
of interdependence. People’s dissatisfaction is channelled in reinstatement of borders,
rejecting common rules and limiting competence of European institutions. However, these
are a continuation, not a break from the current thinking about EU and governance. It is a
mirror image of progressive pooling of sovereignty – of institutional cooperation,
demolishment of borders and setting up of common standards. Euroscepticism – and Brexit
– are a brainchild of the existing thinking about the Union.
The three broad options for the future British involvement with the Union – joining the
existing EEA (European Economic Area) Agreement, which Norway, Lichtenstein and
Iceland had concluded with the EU, a specific bilateral agreement with the EU (like
Switzerland) or a fall-back option to WTO rules of trade – are all on the same continuum of
partial (dis)integration.
When demolishment of borders is set as the main goal of a political project, their
reinstatement becomes the major defence. When the encroachment of powers of the EU
institutions upon the national powers is seen as the central problem of European
governance, “taking your country back”[16] becomes the central opposition to the project.
Likewise, when the central problem of governance is depicted as “over-integration”[17], the
defence is limiting the integration or leaving the project of integration altogether – leading to
the Brexit.
The tragedy is that one of the EU Member States most receptive of new ideas, most open
to intellectual, social and democratic experimentation and by far most welcoming of foreign
intelligentsia decided to continue its course of action on the existing spectrum of thinking
and exit the Union. United Kingdom has been able to draw talent from throughout Europe
and the world, contributing to the affirmation of its position firmly in the center of the
European Union. Parisians, academics, Polish plumbers, Romanian roofers and
intellectuals from across the Continent have been seeking vocational and intellectual refuge
in the UK.
On the other hand, these movements and immigration concerns importantly, if not
decidedly, contributed to the Brexit vote. Historians will surely debate the impact of Eastern
enlargement in 2004, 2007 and 2014 on Brexit for years to come. While the flow of people
was probably one of the most important factors in the vote to leave, the openness to new
ideas still remains relatively conservative and the British discourse about the Union and
governance has remained largely on the existing spectrum of legal thought about
disaggregating, pooling or reinstating sovereignty.
Such a discourse caters to the alienated and aggrieved citizens who are, just as the elites,
unable to articulate the grievances in other terms than ideologies of anti- European Union
or, as in the context of global governance, of anti-neoliberalism. When those on the
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downside of European governance embrace this very ideology and rhetoric and hang on to
it to articulate their grievances, this should be understood as a testament to European
democracy, not its negation. It should be understood as a call for change of the existing
thinking and course of action.
Reproduction of the Status Quo
The daily hierarchical structure is not adequately addressed in the institutional discourse or
in the spectrum of progressive stages of integration and disintegration. The institutional
reimagination and emphasis on the relationship between Union institutions and Member
States and equal citizens tends to misrepresent power relationships. It regulates
relationships between legal orders and equal citizens without sufficiently accounting for the
hierarchical structure at play.
Neither states nor individuals are equal. The global society is hierarchical. The obstacles to
trade are articulated in terms of discrimination, in terms of non-discriminatory ability to
cross the border. Abolishment of these obstacles, however, will not affect all people in the
Union in the same way. Each reduction of obstacles will affect them differently, based on
their structural position and based on the circumstance they will find themselves invoking it.
Building (or disintegrating) an internal market, a free trade regime, or a political union,
reveals relatively little about the society that is being constructed. This debate reduces an
order to its character and governance is thus debated in terms of more or less public and
private legal orders.[18] A “real” internal market free from barriers to trade, however, is an
illusion. Once, the hierarchical structure of society is set as a starting point of analysis, it
becomes clear that the EU internal market is not a constant advancement of free
movement considerations over social considerations, as EU lawyers from both political
poles would like to see it. Rather, it is a complex set of entitlements allocated differently
between different actors in the Union. It is a single market in which some obstacles to some
movements are sporadically reduced and some obstacles to some movements or
autonomies sporadically added.[19]
In the existing discussion about more or less positive and negative integration, people
misread their position in the legal hierarchy. The main qualms of United Kingdom leaders
who were considering an exit from the Union centered on the little power that the United
Kingdom exerts over European law and decision-making. The principle of subsidiarity,
introduced into the Amsterdam Treaty in order to placate the somewhat Euroskeptic Tory
party, seems not to have played its intended role of decentralization. These frames of
argument are structured with the EU institutions as the center and Member States as the
periphery, or the reverse.
When institutions in Brussels are characterized as the center and those in Berlin, Paris, or
Athens as the periphery, the question of “who decides” frames the discussion about power
relationships. Taking Brussels as the center and Member States as the periphery, and
centering on the division of material competences as in Joseph Weiler’s portrayal of the
Union, demands for greater regulatory autonomy and subsidiarity in light of competence
building by EU institutions seems like a natural reflex. In this debate, the United Kingdom
sees itself as peripheral in the Union and strives for an empowering exit.
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Control over law-making and on cross-border movements and consequently participation in
a system or leaving the system takes central stage in thinking about governance. A retreat
to sovereign powers, however, like desire for a full participation in a system, can prove to
be an illusion. In an interconnected world, the idea of an “independent” UK is an illusion.
The exit from the European Union cannot be total, it is necessarily selective. EU institutions
form an important cluster of regulatory power, so the British objection that their Parliament
merely ratifies whatever is sent from Brussels might be the experience of those who are not
Member States just as well. The regulatory power of the Union inevitably extends both
formally and informally far beyond the borders of the European Union in competition law
and in countless other legal domains. In other words, the United Kingdom, even after
having left the Union, might inevitably find itself under the influence of the regulatory
machinery of the Union.[21]
Moreover, the intellectual focus on “control” or agency based on equality misses the
hierarchical structure. United Kingdom’s position is firmly in the hierarchical center of the
European Union. United Kingdom has significant clusters of hierarchically privileged actors
who find themselves, what could in many respects be interpreted as higher in the
hierarchies of production in the global structure of nearly any human activity—production of
goods, services, dreams, and intellectual activity—than actors from another peripheral
country. CEOs, lawyers, bankers, professors, pop stars, and athletes are part of these.[22]
Despite some of the inevitable negative consequences of Brexit on some sections of the
population from both sides of the Channel, the UK will stay in the center of the European
Union in economic, cultural, intellectual, military and political sense. While the UK may
occasionally be harmed by not sitting at the table of decision-making, the relevance of the
structure, which is beyond the control of a single agent, and contributes to the reproduction
of hierarchies, is missed in the discussion on Brexit and in the reform of the European
Union in general.
European Union does not need just any reform. Reform has been the driving force of the
EU since its beginnings and has been in fact its “raison d’etre”. The reformism of the EU,
however, has been anti-structural – contributing to the reproduction of the existing
distribution of wealth, power and authority in the Union – including to the reproduction of
the hierarchical positions of outsiders, such as those in Britain or Switzerland. [23] The way
we, European lawyers, speak and think about Europe reproduces the existing hierarchies
and entrenches the center’s domination over the EU’s periphery.[24] Furthermore, there is
constant decision-making in society that takes place outside institutions. Those in a
hierarchically privileged position have more privileges with which to abuse the subordinate
and are thus consenting to the structure that generally perpetuates their superiority.
One does not fully lose its capacity to participate in the daily legal construction by formally
leaving a legal order. They are only able to use a limited set of tools differently and in
different social settings. Likewise, people of countries joining the EU do not obtain general
political or legal capacity by joining the Union. Actual political capacity depends on the
position in the hierarchical structure of society that one finds themselves in. UK actors, just
as Swiss actors will remain in a similar legal relationship to other central actors of the
Union, despite the fact that they are outsiders.[25] Thus, just like the EU will keep exerting
influence on the UK, the UK will keep exerting influence on the EU, though these channels
[20]
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of influence will now be understood as “informal”.
While Brexit is understood as a change of epic proportions, the tragedy is that European
and British hierarchical reality is bound to remain largely untouched. Just as the UK will
remain central in the European hierarchical structure after Brexit, Albania will stay
peripheral, no matter whether it joins the EU or not. And the man in the town of Hull who
vividly portrayed his situation and position on Brexit will remain where he is in the
hierarchical structure – no matter whether the leave or remain camp would have won.
Brexit is understood as the nationalist rhetoric par excellence, as the ultimate demon
premised on selfish nationalist rhetoric, or as a rejection of the vision of community – of a
new legal order of shared values and aspirations. From the angle of reproduction of the
status quo, Brexit is far less extreme, extraordinary and epic. Rather, it is a mere position
on the spectrum of existing thinking and reflects daily operation that contributes to the
reproduction of the existing hierarchies.
Democracy as a Remedy to Europe’s troubles
Nor does an effort for “more democracy” offer an avenue for addressing the existing
hierarchical structure. Lack of democracy is a constant lament of Europhiles and
Eurosceptics alike. However, European legal system is not just rhetoric of continuing
democratization, the European Union is a democracy, albeit without a single demos,
informed by and built on the pillars of most sophisticated democratic and constitutional
theory we have ever known. The problem is that the EU is a victim of its own democratic
success.
Immense efforts have been made to make the work of European institutions transparent,
and to observe equality and the rule of law at every instance of decision making. The
European Parliament and national parliaments have been gradually given an increased
role in decision-making. Moreover, citizens have, in principle, so many rights as never
before in history and unprecedented avenues for lawsuits, complaints, petitions, initiatives,
voting, and forums to express their concerns or disagreement. But existing constellations of
judicial review, judicial powers of both the European Court of Justice and national courts,
institutional representation by both national parliaments and the European Parliament, by
Committees and so on attest to the fact that the European Union is a stellar example of a
liberal democracy and of liberal governance.[26]
Rather than addressing the social hierarchical structure, democratic theory can become a
substitute for the vision of transformation of Europe. There are important limits as to how to
transform society with the existing toolbox of democracy. Every layer of democratic
governance, committee, requirement of a report, and inclusion of stakeholders we add to
European government risks adding to a citizen’s sentiment that he does not know where to
turn and that every move he makes is a wrong one. The European Union is so inclusive of
everyone’s opinion in its law-making and decision-making and generally aims at such
transparency that this visibly complex system feels oppressive. Democratic theory is, as
any other, ridden by contradiction and in itself cannot be understood as a panacea for
Europe’s troubles.
Lack of Analytical Clarity and Vision as a Global Phenomenon
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To be fair, lack of analytical clarity and lack of vision are not just problems of European
governance. The overtly political left–right discussion based on the contradiction between
individualism and altruism[27] and guided by ideological abstractions is a part of the
problem of global governance. Rather than addressing the unmeritorious (reproduction of)
hierarchical reality, the central ills of today’s global society are too often articulated in terms
of ideological abstractions – as a result of “neoliberalism” – of demolishment of border
controls and of setting up common standards, as opposed to protectionism. In this
understanding, one legal regime yields more free trade than the other. In the EU setting, the
European periphery gets caught up in ideological abstractions of left and right, foreclosing
the concerns of the periphery from operating powerfully in the ideologically charged debate
about more or less social and free movement considerations.[28]
Ideological frameworks appear to be articulating the hierarchical reality to us already.
However, justice and injustice are not theories, “isms” or concepts. “Injustice” is the
hierarchical reality and its reproduction by our daily work that we need to constantly
construct and reconstruct, in order to address it.[29] Proposals for a healthy left-right
debate in the EU legal discourse and for resistance of legal technocracy by reclaiming the
primacy of politics over law [30] can thus just as well disable us from building new tools to
reconstruct society,[31] preventing an intellectual debate leading to thicker social and
discursive dialectics.
Conclusion
Building a (transnational) legal order without an account of the (reproduction of the) daily
social ills can all too quickly become a self-congratulatory enterprise dissociated from
hierarchical reality. Constant articulation and rearticulating of the daily hierarchical reality,
and construction of tools to combat it, appears unnecessary.
Failure to structurally re-imagine and re-shape Europe or “domestic” societies is present on
both sides of the Channel, in the existing course of action, as well as in the revolt to it.
More or less integration, more or less federalism, more or less common market, more or
less neoliberalism, more or less border control, without the identification of reproduction of
hierarchies are all on the continuum of thinking in terms of Brexit and arrest social re
imagination and social change. Moreover, when there is a lack of analytical clarity or a lack
of vision to change the project, the best way to address one’s disagreement with the
existing state of affairs appears to be to abandon the project and leave. Brexit should not
be understood as an aberration, but as a tragic continuation of Europe’s daily operation.
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